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Fitton: Clarification of Title IV of the Labor-Management Reporting and D

NOTE
Clarification of Title IV of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act:
Toward More Democratic Elections
INTRODUCTION

The strength of a chain depends on the condition of its weakest link.
Similarly, the democratic quality of a society is largely determined by

the kind of democracy that prevails in its component organizations.
The fact that trade unions today represent an important 'link' in

American society may explain the concern of the public over the kind
of democracy that exists in unions. A particularly important aspect of

union democracy is the process through which membership elects its
officers. I
In 1959, the 86th Congress passed the Labor-Management Reporting

and Disclosure Act (LMRDA)2, as a response to the increasing importance of the labor movement in the United States. The Act established

rules which govern the internal affairs of labor organizations, 3 as well as
labor-management relations.4 The purpose of including the former in the
federal statute is to safeguard the rights of union members, 5 while preserv-

ing internal union democracy against assaults of autocratic union man-

I.

REZLER. Union Elections: The Background of Title IV of LMRDA, SYMPOSIUM ON THE

LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, 475 (R. Slovenko ed. 1961)

(footnote omitted).
2. Publ. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), as amended, 79 Stat. 888 (1965), 88 Stat. 852
(1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§401-531 (1976)).
3. Many commentators have noted that incident to governing the internal affairs of labor
organizations, the Act seeks to weed out dishonest practices in labor-management relations which
tend to corrupt union officials by requiring union officers to observe high standards of responsibility
and ethical conduct in union affairs. See, e.g., Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the
Labor Reform Act of 1959. 58 MICH. L. REv. 819 (1960); Coleman v. Brotherhood of Ry. and
S.S. Clerks, 228 F.Supp. 276, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff d, 340 F.2d 206 (2nd Cir. 1965). The
congressional declaration of purpose supports such allegations (i.e., the statute was enacted to
eliminate or prevent improper practices on the part of labor organizations, employers, labor relations
consultants and their officers and representatives which distort and defeat the policies of LM RDA. 29
U.S.C. §401(b) (1976). See also Highway Truck Drivers and Helpers Local 107 v. Cohen, 182 F.
Supp. 608, 617 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd, 284 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961)
(LMRDA came in the wake of congressional findings of crime and corruption in the labormanagement field).
4. Cox, supra note 3, at 819.
5. Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946).
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agement. 6 This purpose is accomplished by guaranteeing members equal
rights and privileges in the nomination and election of union officials;
freedom of speech and assembly; and freedom from arbitrary increases in
dues and assessments. 7 The LMRDA should be interpreted in accordance
with this legislative purpose. However, the diversity of interpretations of
Title IV of the LMRDA, 8 which regulates union elections, leaves many
questions unanswered. The high degree of ambiguity in interpreting
§401(e) of Title IV9 has permitted a maximum amount of judicial discre-

tion in the handling of cases. This note examines one, although not the
exclusive, interpretive problem concerning the nomination of candidates
and the eligibility of union members to be candidates and to hold
offices.I 0

An analysis of the relevant legislative history of the LMRDA and its
effect on union democracy will be presented in support of the conclusion
that §401(e) of Title IV can and should be clarified in order to offer more

substantive protection to valid union elections. The subsequent sections
discuss incidents deemed to be violative of the electorial requirements

outlined in the Act and how these illogical, inconsistent interpretations
can be resolved.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE

LMRDA

Democracy in a political sense implies: "(a) control of governing
decisions by those affected and (b) a decent respect for the fundamental
rights of individuals and minorities, not only by the individuals in power
but also by the ruling majority."' " Viewed in this light, the heart of union
democracy lies in the election of officers. 12 It was upon this premise that
the "Elections" title of LMRDA came into existence.' 3

6. See, e.g., Grand Lodge of Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. King, 335 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964); Wittstein v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 223 F. Supp. 27
(S.D.N.Y. 1963), revd on other grounds, 379 U.S. 171 (1964); Green v. Local 7051 Hotel and
Restaurant Employees and Bartenders' Int'l Union, 220 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Mich. 1963); Gartner v.
Soloner, 220 F. Supp. 115, (E.D. Pa. 1963); Nelson v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 233 (D. Minn. 1962),
affd, 325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963).
7. Stout v. Construction and Gen. Laborers Dist. Council, 226 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. 111.1963).
8. 29 U.S.C. §481(e) (1976).
9. Id.
10. Id.
1I. Cox, supra note 3, at 829.
12. It is apparent that a small group of elected officials must formulate and administer the
policies of a labor organization for it to function. The ultimate goal is to respond to the needs of
union members by seeking increased participation in union affairs. In addition, such responsiveness
depends on various factors, including, but not limited to, frequency of elections, a fair opportunity to
nominate and elect candidates of one's choice and safeguards in counting ballots. Id. at 842-43.
13. In retrospect it seems plain that the enactment of the LMRDA became inevitable when
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The legislative history of Title IV can be divided into two distinct
periods. The first time frame was characterized by state governments
regulations to hamper the undemocratic conduct of some union elections.
This state regulation arose due to congressional disinterest in interfering
with union internal affairs. 14 In contrast, the second period brought federal intervention in the internal affairs of unions and witnessed the passage of federal legislation regarding union administration and election
procedures.15
State Legislation
Prior to the late 1950's, Congress as a matter of policy emphatically
refused to interfere with the regulation and adjudication of internal affairs
of unions.16 Congressional deference continued despite the surge of union
membership in the late 1930's and early 1940's, allowing organized labor
to become a powerful force in our society.17 With union growth came the
problems of union democracy, and a great deal of public attention. 8
The American Civil Liberties Union was the first to protest union
deprivation of the rights of their individual members. In 1947, and again
in 1949, they submitted Trade Union Democracy Bills to the House
Committee on Education and Labor.19 These bills outlined prevalent
undemocratic practices and promulgated recommendations to promote

Congress, by enacting the Wagner Act, not only granted employees the right to bargain collectively
but also transported the political principle of majority rule into labor-management relations
by giving the union designated by the majority the exclusive right to represent all the employees in an
appropriate bargaining unit. Id. at 819.
It should be noted, however, that this point of view was not without staunch critics. See, e.g.,
REDDING, Democracy, Collective Bargainingand LMRDA, in SYMPOSIUM ON THE LABOR-MANAGE-

MENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, 158 (R. Slovenko ed. 1961), wherein he states:
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 poses a dangerous and
entirely new 'police state' type of threat to survival of free democratic processes in
labor-management relations in our nation... LMRDA is far more drastic in its effect than
Taft-Hartley because of its extensive invasion and regulation of the internal affairs of
voluntary organizations which, in the application of this legislation, is restricted to labor
unions.
Id. at 158-59.
14. Rezler, supranote 1, at 475.
15. Id.
16. Id. See also Elgin, Joliet and Eastern R.R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 757 (1945)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting), wherein Justice Frankfurter states: "Union membership generates
complicated relations. Policy counsels against judicial intrusion upon these relations."
17. MURPHY, The Backgroundof the Bill of Rights and Its Provisions,in SYMPOSIUM ON THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, 277, 279 (R. Slovenko ed. 1961).

18.
19.

Id
Ia at 280.
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union democracy.2 0 Despite the importance of such a scheme, Congress,
unfortunately, never seriously considered it.21
The intentional absence of congressional legislation, coupled with
federal courts grave reluctance to exercise their jurisdiction in union elec-

tion cases, left the regulation of union democratic procedures in the hands
of state legislatures and courts. Most states viewed the unions as volun-

tary associations, a category similar to church groups or fraternal organizations.22 Therefore, the states believed unions should be granted an

immense amount of independence in supervising their internal affairs.2 3
For this reason, state legislatures were equally reluctant to interfere with
the internal activities of unions. 24
In 1943, five states passed legislation governing the internal operation of unions in various respects, including provisions for the election of
officers.25 There had been speculation that the ultimate purpose of some
of these laws was to weaken unions, not to purify them.2 6 In recognition
20. Id.at 279.
The chief complaints by rank and file members concern lack of opportunity for full
participation in the conduct of union's affairs, tending to the perpetuation in office of
entrenched officials; the difficulty of organizing an opposition to the leadership; the lack of
adequate machinery for review of expulsions and suspensions; the penalties imposed by
varied means on critics of the leadership; the lack of control over expenditures and assessments in many unions; discrimination in assignment of jobs; and exclusions from membership based on race, sex, or political connections.
Ra at 280.
21. Rezler, supranote 1,at 475. It should be noted, however, that the concern over indifference
to democracy within labor organizations and the rights of minority union members did not go
unnoticed: "Two unions, the Upholsterers' International Union and the United Automobile Workers,
reacted by creating impartial appeal boards to review disciplinary action by the international against
individual members or a local union." Cox, supra note 3, at 820. These union appellate tribunals
represented the first step toward independent judiciary within labor unions. Id Further, it has been
observed that Congress did include certain provisions relating to internal union affairs in the TaftHartley Act.
These included the proviso in section 8(aX3) prohibiting discharge of an employee under a
union shop agreement for any reason other than the failure to tender initiation fees and
periodic dues; section 8(bX5) making it an unfair labor practice for a union to charge an
employee under a union shop agreement an initiation fee found by the NLRB to be
'excessive or discriminatory'....
Murphy, supra note 17, at 280. These provisions represented the first instance of national regulation
of internal union affairs, despite the fact that they had very little effect on union democracy. Id.
22. Rezler, supranote I, at 479.
23. Id
24. Id
25. Id. at 476. The five states passing such legislation were Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Texas
and Minnesota. Only Minnesota's "Union Democracy Act" was entirely devoted to the regulation of
union elections. The remaining statutes regulated other internal affairs as well as election processes.
For further discussion, see Colo. Stat. Ann. c.131 (1943); Fla. Stat. Supp. 481.09 (1947); Kans. Sess.
Laws c.191, §44-801-15 (1943); Texas Gen. and Special Laws c.104 (1943); Minn. Sess. Laws c.625S.F.No. 1144 (1943).
26. Murphy, supranote 17, at 280.
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of this speculation, unions attacked the constitutionality of some of these
provisions to reflect their animosity towards judicial interference. 27 Ultimately, some state courts held the election clauses to be unconstitutional,
while in others, mainly the agricultural states where the number and
importance of unions was negligible, the provisions remained valid. 28
Notwithstanding the state legislatures' attempts to govern unions'
internal processes, there was little enforcement of or litigation concerning
these laws. The state courts afforded the main source of legal relief.2 9 The
recognition of common law in this area did little to rectify the lack of
30
federal power. Various court rulings were uncertain and inadequate,
while inconsistent interpretations created confusion. 31 The administration
of claims, which occurred primarily through individual civil suits, was
32
burdensome and costly for the aggrieved individual.
Towards FederalIntervention
Acceptance of FederalLegislation
In 1957, as a response to mounting-criticism of the abuses of power
by labor organizations, the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO approved
six Ethical Practical Codes. The sixth code concerned union democratic
processes. 33 "The purpose of this code was to 'restate the principles which

27. Two such attacks were successful in rendering the election provisions invalid. In 1944, the
Colorado Supreme Court held the section of the Colorado Labor Peace Act of 1943 providing for the
incorporation of unions and the election of union officers to be unconstitutional. The latter provisions
were not deemed unconstitutional per se, but the entire section was invalidated because of the
unconstitutionality of the mandatory incorporation provisions. In another ruling, a Texas trial court
declared the section of the Texas Labor Act of 1943, which regulated union elections, to be unconstitutional per se because it violated both the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the
State of Texas. Rezler, supranote 1, at 476.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 482.
30. Smith, The Labor-Management Reporting and DisclosureAct of 1959, 46 VA. L. REV.
195, 196 (1960).
31. Rezler, supra note I, at 482.
32. Smith, supra note 30, at 196.
33. Murphy, supra note 17, at 280. The following provisions of the Code addressed union
elections:
I. Each member of a union should have the right to full and free participation in
union self-government. This should include the right (a) to vote periodically for his local
and national officers, either directly by referendum vote or through delegate bodies, (b) to
honest elections, (c) to stand for and to hold office, subject only to fair qualifications
uniformly imposed, (d) to voice his views as to the method in which the unions' affairs
should be conducted.
2. To safeguard the rights of the individual members and to safeguard its democratic
character, the AFL-CIO and each affiliated national or international union should hold
regular conventions at stated intervals, which should be not more than four years. The
convention should be the supreme governing body of the union.
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should govern all free and democratic unions and to rededicate the labor

movement to the preservation of these principles.' "" The code itself did
not promulgate legislative intervention regarding union democracy. Rather,

its aim was to leave the internal affairs of unions in the hands of the

35
unions themselves, and to permit them to institute self-corrective action.
These six Ethical Practice Codes were inadequate in eliminating
public and congressional dissatisfaction with the disclosure of union corruption, which included certain malpractices in their election procedures.
As a result of the Ethical Practice Codes' inadequacies, there was gradual
acceptance of federal intervention in the internal affairs of labor organiza-

tions. Two main sources provided information regarding these election
malpractices: (1) surveys of union constitutions regulating election procedures conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the National
Industrial Conference Board; and (2) the investigations by the Select
Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field,
36
popularly known as the McClellan Committee.
Union Constitution Surveys
In 1958, the Bureau of Labor Statistics studied various union consti-

tutions, specifically their provisions regulating voting procedures and the
5. Officers of the AFL-CIO and of each affiliated international or national union
should be elected, either by referendum vote or by the vote of delegate bodies. Whichever
method is used, election should be free, fair and honest and adequate internal safeguards
should be provided to ensure the achievement of that objective.
7. The appropriate officials of the union and such bodies which are given authority
to govern a union's affairs between conventions should be elected, whether from the
membership at large or by appropriate divisions, either by referendum vote or by the vote
of delegate bodies.
8. Membership meetings of local unions should be held periodically with proper
notice of time and place.
9. Elections of local union officers should be democratic, conducted either by referendum or by vote of a delegate body which is itself elected by referendum or at union
meetings.
10. The term of office of all union officials should be stated in the organization's
constitution or by-laws and should be for a reasonable period, not to exceed four years.
Rezler, supranote I, at 487-88 (quoting UNrrED AUTOMOBILE WORKERS UNION, A MORE PERFECr
UNION... 30-31 (1958)).
34. Murphy, supra note 17, at 280,281.
35. Rezler, supra note 1, at 488. Rezler also comments:
Nevertheless, the Code affected subsequent legislation in two ways: First, by its very
existence the Federation tacitly admitted the need for the correction of certain election
practices; second, the recommendations of the Code served as a source for legislation, and
also as an indicator as to what reforms organized labor would accept without major
resistance.
36.

Id at 482.
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frequency of elections of international presidents. 37 Included in their survey were IIl national and international unions, each having at least
38
10,000 members.
The study of the voting procedures revealed that only thirty-one of
the 111 constitutions surveyed explicitly required the use of secret ballots
for the election of the union president. In the remaining eighty unions,
thirty-one constitutions did not define any voting procedures; twenty-six
union constitutions did not stipulate what type of ballot to be used in
elections; and the remaining twenty-three unions set forth an alternative
39
method of voting.
The presidential election provisions studied did not reveal a consistent pattern regarding the frequency of these elections. 40 In total, ninetyfive percent of the unions surveyed held presidential elections at least
41
every five years.
The National Industrial Conference Board examined the constitutional provisions of 194 international unions regulating the frequency of
their conventions. 42 Despite the variations in their findings, 43 ninety-two
percent of all unions under surveillance held conventions at least every
five years. 44
The importance of these studies was not readily apparent, for neither
indicated any urgent need for federal intervention in union election
procedures. However, coupled with the findings of labor economists such
as Philip Taft, the fallacies existing in the democratic processes of labor
organizations came to light. During the period 1900-1948, Taft examined
thirty-four international unions and the election of their officers.45 Taft
found that the majority of presidential elections were uncontested, due
either to lack of interest or "the successful political machining of the
incumbent officers." 46 Lack of opposing candidates caused similar findings in the elections of other union officials. 47
37. Id. at 483.

38. Ma
39. Id
40. Id. "Of the one hundred and eleven unions studied, six elected its president in every year,
forty-two in every second year, fourteen in every third year, thirty-four in every fourth year and ten
elected their presidents in every fifth year." Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id."... 26.3 percent held their convention yearly, 33.5 percent every other year, 11.3
percent every third year, and 13.9 percent every fourth year. Only 8.1 percent of the unions studied
held a convention either less frequently than every five years or had no constitutional provision for
holding a convention." Id
44. Id
45. Id

46. Id
47. Id
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McClellan Committee
During the first session of the 85th Congress, the Senate Select
Committee of Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field
was set up under Senate Resolutions 74 and 221.48 These Resolutions
instructed the McClellan Committee to investigate the improprieties of
both labor and management organizations. However, in reality the latter
were only studied with respect to their associations with labor
organizations. 49
The Committee commenced its investigations in 1957 and issued its
first Interim Report in March, 1958.50 The report admitted that the
majority of the various local and regional units of approximately ten
51
international unions studied were operated honestly and democratically.
However, in four of the international unions, a substantial lack of demo52
cractic processes in the election of officers was revealed.
Specifically, the report stated that in the unions studied, constitutions
had been perverted or ignored; one man dictatorships had thrived;
through fear, intimidation and violence, the rank and file member
had been shorn of a voice in his own union affairs; and that use of the
secret ballot had been denied in many cases. 53
These findings were sufficient to establish support for the demand
that all unions, corrupt or otherwise, be subject to restrictions to prevent
them from being utilized for selfish and unorthodox purposes.5 4 The
Committee itself recommended legislative action to establish basic standards of democratic procedure, including periodic elections and use of a
secret ballot.55 Thus, the institution of this Committee represented the
most dramatic development towards federal intervention in the internal
56
affairs of unions.
48. Id at 484.
49. Id

50. Murphy, supranote 17, at 281.
51.

Id.

52. Rezler, supranote 1,at 484. It should be noted that initially the Committee's prime concern
was dishonest union officers misappropriating funds, illicit profits, and violence and racketeering
within unions. Subsequently, they also focussed on secondary boycotts and organizational picketing.
However, upon further investigation, the Committee found evidence of internal misgovernment. Cox,
supra note 3, at 820.
53. Murphy, supra note 17, at 281.
54. RosE, A Comparisonof the Statutory and ConstitutionalBill ofRights,in SYMPOSIUM ON
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, 290, 292 (R. Slovenko ed.

1961).
55. Rezler, supra note 1, at 486. However, the idea of federal intervention was not unanimously supported. For example, Senator McNamara dissented in the Committee's First Interim
Report because he did not feel the evidence was of such a sufficient nature to mandate the imposition
of federal legislation. Id.
56. Murphy, supranote 17, at 281.
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Recommendationsfor DemocraticReform
In addition to the McClellan Committee's recommendations, the
American Civil Liberties Union issued a new detailed labor union "Bill of
Rights" which included a section dealing with the freedom of elections
and balloting. 57 The recommendations for democratic union reform
included therein were published in March, 1958, and were more detailed
and concrete than those of the McClellan Committee. 58 The importance
and impact of the suggestions espoused by the ACLU would be seen later

in subsequent labor reform bills, for the sponsors of those various bills
incorporated many of these same provisions. 59 Consequently, traditional

concepts of union morality and conduct were taken out of union hands
and placed in the federal forum.
FederalIntervention
An aroused nation spurred Congress into abandoning its reluctance

to intervene in the internal affairs of labor organizations. Various bills
were introduced in the 85th Congress aimed at regulating union democratic processes; these convinced labor leaders that federal legislation was
57. Rezler, supranote 1, at 487. The following provisions of the Bill of Rights referred to union
elections:
I. In a membership organization, the freedom of election and balloting is the ultimate and most important freedom in the democratic conduct and control of the group.
Therefore:
(a) Every member shall have the right to vote, on an equal basis with all other
members, without fear of reprisal.
(b) Other than voting in a representative body (e.g., a convention, or a shop
stewards' council or a city labor council) where the individuals represented have the right to
know how their delegates voted, the secrecy of ballot shall prevail, and an honest count, free
from initimidation shall be guaranteed through the presence at the count of opposing
candidates, or their representatives, and, if necessary, through the supervision of an impartial, outside agency. This supervision should be required if a petition containing the signatures of at least ten per cent of the union membership is presented.
(c) Any member of the union shall have the right to stand for and hold office,
subject to fair qualifications uniformly imposed. No elected officer shall be removed from
office except after reasonable notice and a fair hearing on the charges.
2. To insure proper discussion and review of union politics, there shall be regular
meetings at reasonable intervals and elections with reasonable and uniform notice to union
members.
(a) Every national labor organization shall meet in open, national convention
within a reasonable period of time (such as at least once every four years) for the purpose of
a full and open discussion of union policy. The election of officers shall take place at this
convention or through a referendum.
(b) Delegates to convention shall be elected by the membership they represent and
their election shall be held in a manner clearly prescribed in the union constitution, and
adequate notice of such election must be given to each member.
Id. at 487 (quoting AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION "BILL OF RIGHTS" (1958)).

58.
59.

Rezler, supranote I, at 487.
Id. at 488.
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inevitable. 60 Of these bills, the most comprehensive was introduced by
Senators Kennedy and Ives in June, 1958.61 Union election procedures
were provided for in Title III of the Kennedy-Ives bill. 62 Labor organizations were required under this proposal to hold periodic elections of
union officers, either by secret ballot or by a convention of delegates
chosen by secret ballot.63 In addition, the bill established rules which
sought to guarantee each member: (1) an opportunity to vote and nominate candidates without coercion or restraint; 64 and (2) advance notice of
the time and place of the election. 65 Ballots and all other records pertaining to the election were to be preserved and union treasury money was
not to be used for the promotion of candidates. 66 Enforcement of these
rules was to be vested in the Secretary of Labor, who had the right to
order and conduct a new election if the first was deemed illegal by a
federal court. 67
Senator McClellan proposed various additional provisions, including the barring of criminals from holding union office and designating
various offenses against unions as federal crimes. 68 The Senate Labor
Committee combined all of the suggested provisions and presented it to
the Senate for approval.
The Kennedy-Ives bill was passed by the Senate by an overwhelming
majority of 88 to 1 without substantial change. 69 However, in the summer
of 1958, the House abandoned the bill, due in part to the strong opposi70
tion of both labor unions and various business groups.
When the 86th Congress convened in January, 1959, a new bill
sponsored jointly by Senators Kennedy and Ervin was introduced. Its
60.
61.

Cox, supranote 3, at 821.
Rezler, supra note 1, at 489. The policy behind this bill was espoused in sections 2(a) and

(b):

[lIt is essential that labor organizations . . . and their officials adhere to the highest
standards of responsibility and ethical conduct of the internal affairs of their organizations
particularly as they affected labor management relations... The Congress further finds
from recent investigations in the labor and management fields a number of instances of
breach of trust, corruption, disregard of the rights of individual employees and other
failures to observe high standards of responsibility and trust, which require further and
supplementary legislation that will afford necessary protection of the rights and interests of
employees.
Id.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Cox, supranote 3, at 821.
Id.
Rezler, supra note 1, at 489-90.
Id. at 490.
Cox, supranote 3, at 821.
Id.
Id. at 822.
Id.
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election provisions were analogous to those in Title III of the defunct
Kennedy-Ives bill.7 1 The Senate Labor Committee initiated hearings and
the changes made resulted in more detailed and better organized regulations, especially in the title governing union election procedures. 72 On
April 25, 1959, the Senate passed the amended version of the KennedyErwin bill.

73

Concurreiit hearings on the House of Representatives' versions of a
labor reform bill were held by a joint subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor.74 The legislators were debating over three
major proposals. The first, known as the Shelley bill, was a moderate bill
supported mainly by the labor movement and representatives regarded as
friendly to organized labor.75 The Elliot bill, slightly more stringent, was
based primarily upon the Senate's Kennedy-Ervin bill. However, it did
contain some differences in important aspects of the "Bill of Rights. ' 76
The introduction of provisions establishing the fiduciary duties of union
officials and a federal remedy for violations of this duty proved to be the
bill's most important contribution. 77 The strictest of the three proposed
was the Landrum-Griffith bill, which combined the Elliot provisions dealing with reporting and disclosure, elections, trusteeships, and fiduciary
duties of union officials, with the Senate version of the Bill of Rights.78 In
addition, the bill promulgated new restrictions upon secondary boycotts
and organizational picketing.79 The House ultimately passed the LandrumGriffith bill.80
A Conference Committee was established, and within two weeks the
sharp differences between the House and Senate regarding some details of
the regulation of internal union processes were resolved. The Conference
Report agreed to was adopted in both houses overwhelmingly and
became known as the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959.81 The federal govenment had finally assumed the primary
82
responsibility for the policing of unions.

71,
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
7.
80.
81.
82.

Rezler, supranote 1, at 490.
Cox, supranote 3, at 822.
Rezler, supra note 1, at 492.
Id.
Id. at 493.
Cox, supranote 3, at 822.
Id.
Id
Id at 822-23.
Id. at 823.
Id.
Smith, supranote 30, at 197.
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PROBLEMS WITH TITLE IV

The purpose of Title IV is to ensure "free and democratic" union
elections. 83 "The legislative history shows that Congress weighed how best
to legislate against revealed abuses in union elections without departing
needlessly from its longstanding policy against unnecessary governmental
intrusion into internal union affairs." 4 The congressional intent to
accommodate both of these purposes is reflected in §401(e),85 which provides in pertinent part:
In any election required by this section which is to be held by secret
ballot a reasonable opportunity shall be given for the nomination of
candidates and every member in good standing shall be eligible to be a
candidate and to hold office (subject to section 504 of this title and to
reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed) and shall have the right
to vote for or otherwise support the candidate or candidates of his
choice, without being subject to penalty, discipline, or improper interference or reprisal of any kind by such organization or any member
thereof... 86
This section, while requiring labor organizations to protect the individual rights of union members in the election processes, does not render
unions powerless to restrict candidacies for union office.8 7 The union has
the right to impose "reasonable qualifications" upon its members. The
obvious question raised by this section is, what constitutes "reasonable
qualifications uniformly imposed"?
The language of the statute, when interpreted liberally, reflects the
historical reason for the clause, namely, to ensure "free and democratic"
union elections. Thus, to determine whether a requirement is a "reasonable qualification" within the meaning of §401(e), it must be measured in
terms of its consistency with such historical purpose. 88 Notwithstanding
the specific wording of the statute, it has been held that Congress did not
intend that the authorization in §401(e) of "reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed" be given a broad reach.8 9 Unfortunately, this does little
83. Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 470 (1968); Wirtz v. Local
Union No. 125, Laborers' Intl Union, 389 U.S. 477 (1968). More specifically, Congress sought to
protect the rights of rank-and-file members by having them "participate fully in the operation of their
union through processes of democratic self-government, and, through the election process, to keep
the union leadership responsive to the membership." Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees, Local
6, 391 U.S. 492, 497 (1968).
84. Glass Bottle Blowers, 389 U.S. at 470-71.
85. Local 3489, United Steelworkers of Am. v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 315 (1977) (Powell J.,
dissenting).

86. 29 U.S.C. §481(e) (1976).
87.
88.
89.

Steelworkers, 429 U.S. at 308.
Hotel Employees, 391 U.S. at 499.
Id. "This conclusion is buttressed by other provisions of the Act which stress freedom of
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to clarify the meaning and scope of the clause. It remains unsatisfactorily
vague; what is deemed a "reasonable qualification" in some contexts, is
not necessarily a "reasonable qualification" in others.
Courts have used a policy analysis approach to rationalize distinctions. The LMRDA was expressly enacted to curb any unduly restrictive
candidacy qualifications which may result in limiting members' eligibility
for office, or limiting the right to vote for candidates of one's choice or the
threat of self-perpetuating incumbency, be it benevolent or malevolent. 90 It
is unclear how "unduly restrictive" the requirement must be before the
election will be voided and a new one ordered under the supervision of the
Secretary of Labor.91
To aid in clarifying the clause, it has been held that "A classification
'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground or
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike'. "92
Therefore, if a requirement is questionable, the reasons for upholding it
and the election held must be weighed against the underlying policy of
§401(e): "free and democratic" union eleetions. As with other balancing
tests, whether the quantum of evidence offered establishes a prima facie
violation ultimately depends upon the trier of fact.
Title IV and the Courts: Case Law Confusion
The Supreme Court's interest in preserving "free and democratic"
union elections within the bounds of the "reasonable qualifications"
members to nominate candidates for office." Id See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §41 l(a)(1) (1976) (stating that
"Every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights and privileges within such organization
to nominate candidates ..... ).
90. See Hotel Employees, 391 U.S. at 499.
91. §402(c), 29 U.S.C. §482(c) (1976). This section provides in pertinent part:
If, upon a preponderance of the evidence after a trial upon the merits, the court finds-

(2) that the violation of section 401 may have affected the outcome of an election, the
court shall declare the election, if any, to be void and direct the conduct of a new election
under supervision of the Secretary and, so far as lawful and practicable, in conformity with
the constitution and bylaws of the labor organization ....
Id.
92. Shultz v. Local 1291, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 338 F. Supp. 1204, 1207 (E.D. Pa. 1972),
affJd sub nom. Hodgson v. Local 1291, I'ntl Longshoremen's Ass'n, 461 F.2d 1262 (3d Cir. 1972)
(quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)):
Reed was a decision involving an arbitrary preference given to men over women in the
choosing of estate administrators in Idaho. The Supreme Court held such adiscrimination
to amount to a denial of Equal Protection ....
While it is unnecessary for us to so decide, it would appear that the question of
reasonableness involves many of the same considerations as of Equal Protection. What we
say with respect to reasonableness is also applicable to an Equal Protection analysis.
At at 1207 n.5.
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clause of §401(e) is exemplified in Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club
Employees Union, Local 6.93 In Hotel EmpAoyees, the Court addressed
the question, "what constitutes a reasonable qualification?" by analyzing a
bylaw which limited eligibility for major elective offices to union members
who hold or have previously held elective office. 94 The Secretary of Labor
challenged the union's bylaw as not being within Congress' intent of a
"reasonable qualification" when it passed §401(e) of the Act and, therefore, sought to set aside the May 1965 election. 95 The District Court held
that the prior office requirement was not reasonable, but refused to set
aside the election because it could not be found that the bylaw in effect at
the time of the election "may have affected the outcome. 9 6 The court

granted an injunction against enforcement of the bylaw by the union in
future elections. 97 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed
and set aside the injunction, stating that the bylaw was reasonable and not
98
violative of §401(e).
The Supreme Court held the restriction to be an unreasonable qualification and that its enforcement "may have affected the outcome" of the
election. 99 The Court sought to define the parameters of "reasonable

qualifications" consistently with the goals established in the legislative

history of §401(e) of the Act.10 0 In determining guidelines for interpretation of "reasonable qualifications" the Court held that Congress intended
the clause to be interpreted narrowly; thus the bylaw "must be measured
in terms of its consistency with the Act's command to unions to conduct

93. 391 U.S. 492(1968).
94. Id. at 493-94.
The bylaw provided:
In order to be eligible for nomination as an officer, a candidate must possess the
following qualifications: (1) He must be a member of the Union in continuous good
standing for a period of two years immediately preceding his nomination; (2) He must be a
member of either the Assembly or the Executive Board, or else, at some time in the past,
have served at least one term on either the Executive Board, the Assembly, or the old Shop
Delegates Council. In order to be eligible for nomination as a member of the Executive
Board, as a delegate to the Assembly, or as a department delegate, a candidate must be a
member of the Union in continuous good standing for a period of at least one year
immediately preceding his nomination.
Id at 494 n.1.
95. Id The Secretary further charged that enforcement of the bylaw "may have affected the
outcome" of the election and as such sought to set aside the May 1965 election under §402(c). Id. See
also supra note 91.
96. 391 U.S. at 495.
97. Id
98. Id "The court found it unnecessary in that circumstance to decide whether enforcement of
the bylaw at the election may have affected the outcome." Id.
99. Id. Thus, the Secretary of Labor was entitled to an order directing a new election under his
supervision. Id.
100. Id at 496-99. See also supra notes 11-82 and accompanying text.
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'free and democratic' union elections." 101 This language indicates that a
balancing test be utilized in evaluating the scope of restrictions allowable
under §401(e).
Consistent with these espoused principles, the Hotel Employees
Court considered this election to be seriously impaired because the candidacy qualifications substantially depleted the number of members who
might run in opposition to the incumbents. 02 The consequence of such a
bylaw is that it places control in the incumbents' hands. This is precisely
what Congress was legislating against when it enacted the LMRDA.103
The Local attempted to defend this potential self-perpetuating
incumbency as a "reasonable qualification" by showing the incumbents'
impressive record of managing the union's affairs. 10 4 However, the Court
rejected the union's argument as unpersuasive because "Congress designed
Title IV to curb the possibility of abuse by benevolent as well as
malevolent entrenched leaderships." 105 In addition, the union tried to
justify its restriction by claiming it was a means of limiting holders of
important union offices to those members who have knowledge of the
union's problems obtained through service in other offices. 10 6 The Second
Circuit accepted this rationale; 107 the Supreme Court did not. 08 The
Court rejected the argument because it assumed that the members were
unable to distinguish those candidates who are qualified and those who
are not. This belief is inconsistent with Congress' model of democratic
elections where voters are assumed to exercise common sense and
judgment in electing their representatives. 10 9 Further, the Court held the

101. 391 U.S. at 499.
102. Id. at 505. "By the terms of the bylaw, in the May 1965 election only 1,725 of the 27,000
members were eligible to run for office." Id. at 501. Thus, the candidacy qualifications imposed by the
bylaws rendered 93% of the union's membership ineligible for office. Id at 502.
103. Id. at 505.
104. Id. at 503.
105. Id
106. Id.
107. Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, Local 6, 381 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1967).
The court stated:
[It is not self-evident that basic minimum principles of union democracy require that every
union entrust the administration of its affairs to untrained and inexperienced rank and file
members ... It does not seem to us to be surprising that the union should hesitate to permit
a cook or a waiter or a dishwasher without any training or experience in the management
of union affairs to take on responsibility for the complex and difficult problems of administration of this union ...
We do not believe that it is unreasonable for a union to condition candidacy for offices
of greater responsibility upon a year [sic] of the kind of experience and training that a union
member will acquire in a position such as that of membership in Local 6's Assembly.
id at 505.
108. Hotel Employees, 391 U.S. at 504.
109. Id.
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Local was not "faithful to its-own premise" since members without prior
office-holding experience could be appointed to fill a vacancy in any
office. 110
Hotel Employees provides a framework for the interpretation of the
"reasonable qualifications" clause contained in §401(e) of the Act. The
principles espoused, however, did little to clarify the clause: they did not
define the necessary elements for a qualification to be deemed "reasonable". The following cases demonstrate the difficulties in applying these
policies and the conflicting interpretations that have resulted in courts
trying to further define the clause.
The 1977 decision of Local 3489, United Steelworkers of America v.
Usery"I further illustrated the Supreme Court's unwillingness to uphold a
qualification it felt had a substantial anti-democratic effect which
outweighed the interests urged in its support. 12 The provision at issue in
the union's constitution was a meeting-attendance requirement that
limited eligibility for local union office to members who had attended at
least one-half of the Local's regular meetings for three years prior to the
election." 3 Members were excused if they were prevented from attending
due to union activities or working hours." 4 The Secretary of Labor
sought to invalidate the 1970 election" 5 because the bylaw was not a
"reasonable qualification" and was therefore violative of §401(e) of the
LMRDA.116 The District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
dismissed the complaint, refusing to find a violation of the Act. 17 The
Seventh Circuit reversed," 8 holding that:
[T]he failure of 96.5%11 9 of the local members to satisfy the meetingattendance requirement, and the rule's effect of requiring potential
insurgent candidates to plan their candidacies as early as eighteen
months in advance of the election when the reasons for their opposi-

110. Id.
11I. 429 U.S. 305 (1977).
112. Id.at310.
113. Id. at 306. Constitution of International Union, United Steelworkers of Am., Art.
VII, §9(c) (1968). Id. at 307 n.1.
114. Id. at 306-07.
115. See supra note 91.
116. 429 U.S. at 306-07.
117. Id. at 307.
118. Brennan v. Local 3489, United Steelworkers of Am., 520 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1975).
119. 429 U.S. at 308. At the time of the challenged election, there were approximately 660
members in good standing, but only twenty-three of these members were eligible to hold office. Of
these twenty-three, nine were incumbents. Id.at 307-08.
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tion might not have yet emerged, 20 established that the requirement
has a substantial antidemocratic effect on local union elections.121
122
Despite the considerable factual differences from Hotel Employees,
the Supreme Court invalidated the Steelworkers' bylaw for essentially the
same public interest principles outlined therein. 23 The Court dismissed
petitioners' contention that the bylaw in Hotel Employees, which was
violative of §401(e), was significantly different from their meetingattendance requirement. 24 Under the Steelworkers' rule, petitioners
argued, a member who wished to be a candidate could assure his own
eligibility by merely following the mandated procedure of meeting
attendance; under the Hotel Employees bylaw, the restriction disqualified
a category of members who could not assure their own eligibility for
union office because others controlled the criterion for eligibility.1l 5 The
effect of the latter provision was predictable at the time the bylaw was
enacted. 126Further, according to the Hotel Employees Court, the rule was
deliberately designed to entrench union leadership. 127 No member of the
Steelworkers union was precluded from establishing eligibility.128 In addition, the effect of this rule could not be predicted, for any member who
129
had the requisite interest in the union's affairs was eligible to seek office.
The Supreme Court conceded that the "LMRDA does not render
unions powerless to restrict candidacies for union office", 30 but contended that this bylaw, in requiring a member to decide upon potential
candidacy at least eighteen months in advance, has a substantial antidemocratic effect. 131 Thus, this requirement might serve to discourage
candidates from seeking election and thereby "impair the general membership's freedom to oust incumbents in favor of new leadership.' ' 32 To
rebut this, petitioners argued that the rule was "reasonable" because it

120. Id. at 308. "Regular meetings were held on a monthly basis. Thus, in order to attend half
of the meetings in a three-year period, a previously inactive member desiring to run for office'would
have to begin attending 18 months before the election." Id. at n.5.
121. Id. at 308.
122. Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492 (1968).
123. In its decision, the Steelworkers Court relied on the objective of Title IV to" 'protect the
rights of rank-and-file members to participate fully in the operation of their union through processes
of democratic self-government, and, through the election process, to keep the union leadership
responsive to the membership.' "429 U.S. at 309 (citing Hotel Employees, 391 U.S. at 497).
124. 429 U.S. at 310.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 315 (Powell, J., dissenting).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 316 (Powell, J., dissenting).

129. Id.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 308.
Id. at 311.
Id.
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encouraged attendance at union meetings and assured more qualified
officers by limiting election to those who had demonstrated an interest in

union affairs and were familiar with union problems. 133 The Court found
this argument unpersuasive.134 The dissent noted, however, that while

these were legitimate and meritorious union purposes, it may be argued
that requiring attendance at eighteen of thirty-six meetings before an
election goes farther than is necessary to attain these goals. 135 "But this is a
'judgment call' best left to the unions themselves absent a stronger showing of potential for abuse than has been made.. .,136 This view is consist-

ent with Congress' intent not to interfere needlessly, but is inconsistent
with the majority in Steelworkers.
However, in accordance with the legislative history of §401(e), 137 the
Court recognized that the reasonableness of any meeting-attendance
requirement must be analyzed in light of all the circumstances of a particular case, including the impact of the rule. 138 The majority here skirted
some crucial points in this case. "There was no history of entrenched
leadership and no evidence of restrictive union practices precluding free
133. Id. at 312.
134. Id. See also Marshall v. Local 1402, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 617 F.2d 96 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied,449 U.S. 869 (1980). (The court of appeals, relying heavily on Steelworkers v. Usery, held
that the anti-democratic effects of the union eligibility requirement for election of officers, that a
member must have attended, or been excused from, at least one of the twq regular meetings in each of
the twelve months prior to nomination, outweighed the interests urged in support of the requirement.

Despite the fact that the excuse provisions were liberal, requiring no reason for absences (i.e., a
member simply had to notify the Union office in advance of a scheduled meeting in order to obtain an
excused absence), 93.7% of the membership was ineligible. The court held that the eligibility rule is
not judged by the burden it imposes on the individual candidate, but by its effect on free and
democratic processes of union government. Further, the liberal excuse provisions undermined the
only legitimate purpose of the byhqw asserted by the Union, namely that the rule encouraged
attendance and insured nominees who would have at least minimal awareness and interest in the
activities of the Union.); Usery v. Local Division 1205, Amalgamated Transit Union, 545 F.2d 1300
(1st Cir. 1976) (the court rejected the liberal excuse provision permitting a member to mail a post card
within a week after a meeting to obtain attendance credit, holding that the bylaw served little purpose
other than to screen out those who had not decided to run for office soon enough to meet the
attendance requirement.).
135. 429 U.S. at 316-17 (Powell, J., dissenting).
136. Id.
137. See supra notes 11-82 and accompanying text.
138. 429 U.S. at 313. The court states:
Experience has demonstrated that it is not feasible to establish arbitrary guidelines for
judging the reasonableness of [a meeting-attendance eligibility requirement]. Its reasone,bleness mqst be gauged in light of all the circumstances of the particular case, including not
only the frequency of meetings, the number of meetings which must bf attended and the
period of time over which the requirement extends, but also such factors as the nature,
availability and extent of excuse provisions, whether all or most members have the
opportunity to attend meetings, and the impact of the rule, i.e., the number or percentage of
members who would be rendered ineligible by its application.
Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. §452.38(a) (1976)).
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and democratic elections."' 39 The record reflected that during the preceeding ten years, five different presidents had been elected and in the course
of four separate elections, approximately forty changes in officers had
taken place. 40 Finally, the Court relied heavily on the fact that 96.5% of
the union membership was excluded from running from office and as
such, severely restricted the free choice of the membership.' 4 The Secretary of Labor argued that "Hotel Employees enunciated a per se 'effects'
rule, requiring invalidation of union elections whenever an eligibility rule
disqualifies all but a small percentage of the union's membership.
Although the Court today does not in terms adopt a per se 'effects'
analysis, it comes close to doing so."142 This "effects" test was to be one
factor in assessing "reasonableness", not the exclusive factor; as the dissent points out, it is ambiguous and could invalidate almost any attendance qualification.143
In using the term "reasonable," the Court contends that Congress
contemplated a flexible rule. 144 However, the majority provides little
insight in interpreting the election statute and analyzing this "flexibility"
issue. Rather, the Steelworkers Court viewed this flexibility as an overiding factor in order to obtain the same result as Hotel Employees, when
the facts indicate that similar conclusions may not have been warranted.
In Schultz v. Local 1291, InternationalLongshoremen's Association, 45 the court held that the union bylaw allocating union offices along
racial lines' 46 was invalid as an unreasonable qualification on the right of
union members in good standing to be candidates and to hold office. 47
Relying on the premise of Hotel Employees that" 'reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed' should not be given a broad reach,' 48 the court
asserted that the depridation of 50% of the union membership from

139. 429 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J., dissenting).
140. Id.
141.
L at 310.
142. Id. at 315 (Powell, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 317 (Powell, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 313.
145. 338 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Hodgson v. Local 1291, Intl
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 461 F.2d 1262 (3rd Cir. 1972).
146. Rule 3(c)(3) of Local 1291's bylaws was at issue:
In accordance with tradition heretofore observed, the President shall be of the colored race,
Vice President, white, Recording Secretary, white, Financial Secretary, colored. Asst.
Financial Secretary, white, 4 Business Agents equally proportioned, 3 Trustees (Auditors),
I white & 2 colored, 2 Sergeants at Arms, I colored and 1 white.
Id. at 1205.
147. Id. at 1206.
148. Id. (quoting Hotel Employees, 391 U.S. 492,499 (1968)).
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holding office had not resulted in a union election conducted in a "free
49
and democratic" manner.1
The Longshoremen's court held there was no compelling reason to

uphold this bylaw because there was "no objective relationship between
the eligibility qualifications and the duties of the office involved." 50 In
utilizing this balancing test, the court held that the anti-democratic effect
outweighed the asserted objective of the bylaw. 151 The court was also
troubled because the rule was a "permanent disbarment from union elective positions." 152 In addition, the phrasing of the bylaw may have
resulted in the exclusion from office those persons not deemed to be either
"colored" or "white".'153
The Local sought to justify the bylaw by claiming that the rule was
required to maintain an integrated union and as such fostered the cause of
civil rights.154 The court rejected this argument as being unduly specula-

tive, for "should the racial composition of persons looking for jobs as
longshoremen change, it seems likely that union membership would have
to reflect that change."1 55 Lastly, the court noted in invalidating the bylaw
that it would not consider a restriction to be a "reasonable qualification"
under the LMRDA, when the same would be considered an unlawful
employment practice under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.156
The Longshoremen's court broadened the interpretation of "reasonableness". However, the boundary line between "reasonable" and
"unreasonable" was not predicated substantially on the "effects" test as
149. 338 F. Supp. at 1208.
150. -el at 1206-07. Under this rule, "whether one has merit or ability or experience to hold
office is immaterial if the appropriate racial characteristic is not also present." Id. at 1207.
151. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
152. 338 F. Supp. at 1207.
153. Id. at 1208.
154. Id. at 1207. See also Donovan v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982) (The
court of appeals held that the union bylaws which guaranteed 8% of the seats in the union's
Representative Assembly for members of four minority groups and which reserved four places on the
union's Board of Directors for members of such minority groups, violated §401(e) of the LMRDA.
There was no evidence as to how the Association benefited from the restrictions, nor was the choice
of the particular quotas adopted explained. In addition, it was not known whether the minority
groups in question were really underrepresented in the councils of the Association. Therefore, the
court held that the threat to democratic values that this bylaw posed was great, for the reserved seats
were in addition to any that the members of the minority groups might have won in a free election.).
155. 338 F. Supp. at 1207 (footnote omitted).
156. Id. at 1208. The court rejected the rule on still other grounds by finding that "Rule 3(c)(3)
amounts to an unlawful employment practice within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(c):
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership; or otherwise to discriminate against,
any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
Id. at 1207. Further, the Supreme Court has held that" iilf an employment practice which operates
to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.' "Id.
at 1208 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)).
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were the Supreme Court decisions. Had the court based its decision solely
on the "effects" test, the court may not have decided to deem the bylaw
unreasonable.
A more recent analysis of the "reasonable qualifications" clause
occurred in Donovan v. Local Union No. 120, Laborers' International
Union.157 That case involved a union's constitutional requirement that a
candidate for union office be literate and otherwise competent to perform
the duties of the office. 58 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
relying on the main purpose of the Act as preventing undemocratic practices in union governance, 159 held that the competency requirement was
not a "reasonable qualification" capable of being uniformly imposed
within the meaning of §401(e) of the LMRDA.' 60
The court held that the competency qualification violated the congressional mandate of "free and democratic" elections in three respects.
First, the requirement was ambiguous and did not provide the potential
candidate with notice of the specific standards he had to meet to ensure
that he would be eligible for the ballot.' 61 The qualification was thus
anti-democratic for it discouraged potential candidates due to its
62
vagueness.
Secondly, a judgment that a candidate is or is not "competent to
perform the duties of the office" is extremely subjective. 63 Three Judges
of Election, appointed by the incumbent Board to screen candidates,
failed to adopt any specific factors to be considered in determining the
"competency" of a candidate. 164 The significant role of personal judgment
in assessing "competency" made the decision to disqualify a potential
candidate largely discretionary. 65 Therefore, the Laborers'courtheld that
157. 683 F.2d 1095 (7th Cir. 1982).
158. Id. at 1098.
159. Id. at 1102. See also supranotes 11-82 and accompanying text.
160. 683 F.2d at 1105.
161. Id at 1103. The court elaborated:
An essential element ofreasonableness is adequate advance notice to the membership of the
precise terms of the requirement .... Qualifications must be specific and objective. They
must contain specific standards of eligibility by which any member can determine in
- advance whether or not he is qualified to be a candidate.
Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. §452.53 (1981)).
162. 683 F.2d at 1104.
163. Id.
164. Id. The court also held:
A literacy requirement similar to that imposed by the Local's Constitution might be capable
of uniform application if certain objective tests are administered to measure ability to read
and write. A candidate's competency, on the other hand, can not be readily determined by
an objective test; a candidate's fitness for the office of union president, for example, cannot
be readily, determined by tests for leadership, loyalty and administrative ability.
Id.
165. Id
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it was highly unlikely that there could be uniform application of the
competency provision. 66 "When so much discretion is placed in the hands
of those chosen by the incumbents, the possibilities for abuse are clear,
167
and free and democratic elections are threatened."
Finally, the screening by a tribunal of potential candidates for office
did not correspond to the process of political elections-Congress' model
of democratic elections-where the assumption is that voters will exercise
common sense in casting their ballots.168 ", 'In union elections as in political elections, the good judgment of the members in casting their votes
should be the primary determinant of whether a candidate is qualified to
hold office.' "169 The method used for selection of candidates here took
the selection of officers out of the hands of the union members and was,
therefore, an unreasonable qualification.
While the Laborers' opinion provides some new insight into the
interpretation problems inherent in the "reasonable qualifications" clause,
it fails to clarify entirely the confusion and difficulty in applying §401(e).
PROPOSAL FOR RESOLUTION OF THE CONTROVERSY

There is no doubt that §401(e) of the LMRDA was intended to limit
types of bylaws which unduly restrict union members from seeking candidacies for offices. But in seeking to implement this goal, the courts
"must keep in mind the fact that the Act did not purport to take away
from labor unions the governance of their own internal affairs .... ,,170 A
union's freedom to conduct its own elections is reserved for those elections that conform to the democratic principles outlined in §401.171

In accordance with §401(e) "reasonable qualifications" may be
placed on the right of members to be candidates. 72 However, these restrictions must be closely scrutinized to determine whether they serve such
important union purposes to justify subordinating the right of the individual member to seek office.173 When an election is suspected of violating
these standards due to an unreasonable qualification, governmental intervention is postponed until the union has the opportunity to redress the
impropriety.174 Therefore, before invoking the aid of the Secretary of

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id
Id.
Id at 1105.
Id (quoting 29 CF.R. §452.35 (1981)).
Hotel Employees, 381 F.2d 500, 504 (1967), aftd, 391 U.S. 492 (1968).
Glass Bottle Blowers, 389 U.S. 463,471 (1968).
29 U.S.C. §481(e) (1976).

173. 29 C.F.R. §452.35 (1983).
174.

Glass Bottle Blowers, 389 U.S. at 472.
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Labor, a complaining union member must first exhaust his internal union
remedies.175
The fallacy inherent in these procedures is obvious. Logic dictates
that it is highly unlikely that a union will invalidate its own constitutional
provisions as unreasonable qualifications when the union itself believes
that these bylaws were enacted to serve legitimate and meritorious union
purposes. This is not to say that there has been no evidence of unions
passing undemocratic bylaws which undermine the purpose of §401(e) of
free and democratic union elections. The legislative history of the Act
revealed that there was corruption and a substantial lack of democratic
processes in the election of union officers. 176 Rather, the problem lies in
the elasticity of the term "reasonable." Unions do not have clear guidelines upon which they can interpret the meaning and scope of "reasonable
qualifications." This ambiguity induces a case-by-case analysis, leaving
the courts no choice but to interfere in the internal affairs of unions. 77
The courts, however, have failed to establish a consistent approach
to the interpretation of the "reasonable qualifications" standard. 178 Therefore, whether a violation of §401(e) exists ultimately depends on the trier
of fact; the net effect is inconsistency among various levels of the judicial
system. 179 Thus, bylaws which are undemocratic could foreseeably pass
this "reasonableness" test. At the same time, the provisions in question
and the fate of the election could remain unresolved for several years,
waiting for the decision of the final trier of fact.
Judicial discretion in interpreting "reasonable qualifications" has
allowed the courts to focus on the possible undemocratic effects which
certain qualifications may pose, instead of what effects are in fact undemocratic. Courts are given the freedom to interpret the clause according to
their own desired result, when such a result may not be warranted upon
the facts. 80 Thus, the "reasonable qualifications" clause as it currently
exists has the potential to invalidate almost any candidacy restriction
imposed on union members. This risk outweighs the usefulness of the
clause.
The Code of FederalRegulations
Although a specific definition of "reasonable qualifications" has not
been espoused by either the courts or Congress, certain provisions of the
175. Idc
176. See supranotes 11-82 and accompanying text.
177. 29 C.F.R. §452.36(a) (1983): "The question of whether a qualification is reasonable is a
matter which is not susceptible of precise definition, and will ordinarily turn on the facts in each case."

Id
178.

179.
180.

See supranotes 83-169 and accompanying text.
kId
See supra notes 111-44 and accompanying text.
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Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) '18 furnish general guidelines in
assessing the reasonableness of a qualification. 182 However, the problem
with the C.F.R. is it provides too little guidance in interpreting "reasonable qualifications," thereby leaving the meaning and scope of the clause
unsatisfactorily vague. In attempting to clarify this ambiguity, the C.F.R.
often uses the term "reasonable" to interpret the "reasonableness" of a
restriction, only adding to the confusion. 83 Further, the C.F.R. relies
heavily on court decisions, 184 which, as noted earlier, are often inconsistent and irreconcilable. 185
ProposedAmendments
186
Amendments to §452.36(b) of the current C.F.R. provisions will
dismiss some of the shortcomings which presently exist. Select portions of
the C.F.R. are modified in the following proposal, affording unions the
opportunity to forsee what qualifications are "reasonable". The remaining
sections of the C.F.R. are to be left intact.
87
§452.36 REASONABLENESS OF QUALIFICATIONS 1
(b) Some criteria to be met for a qualification for union office to be
"reasonable" are:

(1) The qualification must relate to the legitimate needs and interests of the union and a qualification may not be imposed without a
showing that the majority of the union members are in favor of the
provision;
(2) The qualification must relate to the demands of union office
and the duties of each office are to be outlined in the union's constitution,
where all members will have the opportunity to examine them prior to a
union election;
(3) The qualification can not disqualify more than 50% of the
membership, in light of the congressional purpose of fostering the broadest possible participation in union affairs;
(4) The qualification must be compared to the requirements for
holding office generally prescribed by other labor organizations which are
similarly situated; and
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

29 C.F.R. §§452.32-.54 (1983).
29 C.F.R. §452.36 (1983).
See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §452.41 (1983).
See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §452.36 (1983).
See supranotes 83-169 and accompanying text.
29 C.F.R. §452.36(b) (1983).
Id.
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(5) The degree of difficulty in meeting a qualification by union
members cannot result in more than 50% of the union membership being
ineligible.
The provisions of this proposal are intended to give the interpretation of "reasonable qualifications" less flexibility. This scheme is consistent with the long-standing policy against unnecessary governmental
intrusion into internal union affairs 88 because it allows the unions to
police their own internal controversies.
This proposal eliminates the words "factors to be considered"' 89 in
describing the necessary elements for a qualification to be deemed reasonable. Because many courts are holding these elements out as prerequisites
to reasonableness, they are not to be merely considered; they are the focal
point of analysis and must be heeded. 90
The first and second criteria recognize that a balance must be met
between the interests of labor organizations in prescribing minimum
standards for potential candidates and the purpose of the Act in protecting the rights of rank-and-file members by having them "participate fully
in the operation of their union through processes of democratic selfgovernment, and ... to keep the union leadership responsive to the
membership."' 9' The basic assumption underlying "free and democratic"
union elections, as in political elections, is that the members of labor
organizations will exercise common sense and good judgment in casting
their ballots. 92 Because this is the primary determinant of whether a
candidate is qualified to hold a union office, 193 the same premise should
thus be extended to members voting on the validity of a candidacy qualification. Without this extension, there exists a presumption that the rankand-file members are unable to distinguish "reasonable" qualifications
from "unreasonable" qualifications without the aid of the Secretary of
Labor and the courts. Further, by voting for or against the proposed
qualification, each member is put on notice of the specific standards of
eligibility and he can determine in advance whether or not he is qualified
94
to be a candidate.
The most important aspect of this proposal is the "effects" test.
Courts have relied heavily upon the impact of a qualification in invalidating bylaws for policy reasons. 95 It may be argued that this proposal
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

See supra notes 11-82 and accompanying text.
29 C.F.R. §452.36(b) (1983).
See supra notes 83-169 and accompanying text.
Hotel Employees, 391 U.S. at 497.
29 C.F.R. §452.35 (1983).
1a1
29 C.F.R. §452.53 (1983).
See supra notes 83-169 and accompanying text.
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unduly restricts the union from imposing candidacy restrictions upon its
members. However, case law reveals the reluctance of the courts to
uphold a restriction which bars more than 50% of the union membership. 196 If the union is going to be held to such a standard, it should be
codified to avoid any uncertainty. The built-in percentage limitations will
allow the union to determine whether a qualification is unreasonable
without unnecessary court intervention.
The proposed legislation attempts to facilitate the interpretation of
197
the "reasonable qualifications" clause contained in §401(e) of the Act.
Once the union has failed to meet any of these provisions, the Secretary of
Labor and the courts may step in. In order to safeguard their freedom to
manage their internal affairs, however, legal protection for valid union
elections must begin with the unions themselves.
CONCLUSION

The LMRDA came in the wake of congressional findings of crime
and corruption in the labor field. 98 The extensive history of §401(e)
illustrates the intent of the legislature to eliminate these illegal practices by
ensuring "free and democratic" union elections without unnecessary
intervention by Congress or the courts. 199
The extensive and vigorous debate over Title IV manifested a conflict
over the extent to which governmental intervention in this most
crucial aspect of internal union affairs was necessary or desirable. In
the end there emerged a'general congressional policy to allow unions
great latitude in resolving their own internal controversies, and,
where that fails, to utilize the agencies of Government most
familiar with union problems to aid in bringing about a settlement
through discussion before resort to the courts 2 0
But this can only be accomplished if the rules governing the
interpretation of "reasonable qualifications" are administered in a way to
provide the necessary degree of certainty. Judicial interference, to the
extent it has occurred, unjustifiably cuts the range of candidacy qualifications that unions may place on its members and undermines union
self-governance. The interpretation of "reasonable qualifications" must
be less flexible in order to provide unions with a better scale upon which
to weigh the scope of their restrictions, which in turn will avoid

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id.
29 U.S.C. §481(e) (1976).
See supranotes 11-82 and accompanying text.
Id.
Glass Bottle Blowers, 389 U.S. at 471 (quoting Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140

(1964)).
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183

unwarranted court intrusion and give more substantive protection to
valid union elections. It appears that the need for more specific guidelines
is essential to uphold union democracy: perhaps as essential as the need
for the passage of the interpretive rules in the first instance.
Pamela J. Fitton
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